Abstract：Abstract：Research purposes: Themodem enterprise systemis based on theseparation of ownership and management. Theinterest of state - owned enterprise is often threatened byirregularities of agent (state - owned enterprise manager) owing to incomplete oversight system. Combing Agent with Prisoner’s Dilemma repeated game，behavior evolution model of state - owned manager is established based on spatial evolution game to explore the mechanism of behavior evolution. It is expected to find how to supervise，how to stimulate and howto punish the behavior of state - owned manager by simulating penalty and discipline inspection impact on the behavior evolution of the state - owned managers. Research conclusions:(1) To a great extent，state - owned enterprise managers have irregularities owing to their own reasons in addition to a single incentive. Managers are not sensitive to the high incentive，neither will they change their behaviors dramatically with the increase of incentive. (2) Compared with harsh discipline，state - owned enterprise managers ^behavior is more vulnerable to the influence of income level. State - owned enterprise managers should be punished according to their current income level. ( 3 ) The average income and the income of working hard are negatively related to violation proportion. The irregularity proportion of manager has a negative correlation with the income of violation failure. (4) The conclusion of tliis paper has guiding significance to control irregularities of manager of state - owned enterprise.
2017, Vol. 34 
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