基于维克里理论的铁路工程招投标机制研究

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Abstract Research purposes:The railway project bidding has made great progress in our country since the national infrastructure enforce bidding in January 2000，but there are still many deficiencies，a big problem that the bidders face is information asymmetry. With the deepening and developing background of the railway system，the traditional method of bidding needs necessary reform and improvement. The application of the core content of Vickrey theory in railway project bidding can promote the participants honest quotation. Thus，it can not only configure the limited social resources and reduce the waste of social resources effectively，but also both sides will get the maximum benefit.

Research conclusions:(1)The analysis of the core content of Vickrey theory and the bidding strategy shows that the Vickery theory can effectively solve the problem of dishonest bid under information asymmetry. (2)The application of Vickery's theory in project bidding, can avoid the problem of finite string, so it is more suitable for railway project. (3)Using Vickrey auction theory can make the railway project get cheaper, more high-quality builders.(4)The relevant price incentives can improve the contractor's profit accordingly，reduce the occurrence of corner-cutting phenomenon in a certain extent and ensure the railway engineering construction in a more healthy way. (5)The results can be used in bidding by construction departments of railway engineering and other construction engineering.

Key words： Vickery theory project bidding information asymmetry railway engineering

Received: 10 January 2014

PACS:

F530. 31

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	Articles by authors
	ZHANG Xin-ning
	ZHANG Jin-feng
	LIU Na

Cite this article:

ZHANG Xin-ning,ZHANG Jin-feng,LIU Na. Research on the Railway Project Bidding Based on Vickery Theory[J]. 铁道工程学报, 2014, 31(5): 101-105.

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http://tdgcxb.crec.cn/EN/ OR http://tdgcxb.crec.cn/EN/Y2014/V31/I5/101

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